Oikyofront and its politics
S.M. Faisal Kamal writes for DOT:
Bangladeshi opposition parties working under the banner of JatiyaOikya Front have proposed an ambitious set of reforms and proposals if voted into power. These proposals are ambitious, even far-fetched, for two primary reasons. The first is that it is not entirely clear whether the proposals have been unanimously backed by all factions with equal zeal, even if they are able to project absolute unity for the sake of putting up a united front against the current government. Second, such grand coalitions tend to fall apart when voted into power. This simply has to do with parliamentary dynamics: grand coalitions often become unwieldy and it is difficult to maintain discipline when such a wide variety of actors (and competing ideas) are involved.
Having said that, these reforms deserve serious consideration regardless of how fanciful they might appear, for they are essential to Bangladesh’s democratic future. Four, in particular, are crucial and merit further scrutiny. First, introducing term limits for the office of prime minister, while somewhat paradoxical in parliamentary systems, maybe a good substitute for the now defunct and controversial “care-taker” government, if the idea was to revive it anyway. Of course, institutional safeguards can only do so much to reduce the distrust and enmity that exists between Bangladesh’s two leading parties. Perhaps a temporary restriction on how long one can hold on to power is a better way to break the deadlock. The problem, of course, is that no amount of political and constitutional engineering can, in fact, stop autocrats from assuming power and changing the rules of the game and doing away with these limits and restrictions. A case in point is President Erdogan. Once in power, he literally “ruled by law” to entrench his position and overhaul the system in a way that it is much weaker vis-à-vis the presidency. Similarly, the game of musical chairs between Putin and Medvedev in Russia demonstrates that no constitutional safety valve can actually stop authoritarian governments from tinkering or outright violating such rules. Nevertheless, a term limit may prove to be an essential stopgap solution.
Second, given the size of Bangladesh’s population, it may not be such a bad idea to introduce an upper chamber, a body for “sober second thought”, as the Senate (upper house) is known in Canada. From a Westminster vantage point, second chambers allow for a greater check on executive authority. There is, of course, a wide body of academic literature that has debated the efficacy of an upper chamber as well as the nature of such a body: should it be elected or appointed? Given the near total dominance of the Awami League, perhaps a bit of competition in the form of an upper chamber controlled by the opposition may lead to greater executive accountability. On the other hand, the possibility of both houses being controlled by the same party would not augur well for any meaningful adversarial politics. This is precisely the paradox that many scholars have debated. Relatedly, if the proposed chamber is to be directly elected, there is a possibility of a clash between two sovereigns, two representative bodies claiming equally to speak for the people. This can lead to further destabilization of the entire system. Apart from these technicalities, if second chambers are not just packed with political partisans (if it is to be appointed), then it can provide a meaningful voice to the people. Given that most Bangladeshis have been shut out from the corridors of power, and several lack the political clout and wherewithal to contest elections, appointing various members from the civil society can diversify the kind of people who rule, as well as add the number of perspectives in national debates.
Third, constitutionally enforced party discipline has chocked democracy from within in Bangladesh. Parliamentary systems do require some degree of internal party stability and discipline to govern effectively in legislatures. But to force MPs to toe the party line, that too constitutionally will invariably have a chilling effect on the kind of debate and deliberation that is required on highly divisive political issues. There are, of course, norms that govern deviant behavior. In Canada, for instance, cabinet members are expected to resign if they vote against their own government, but this is a matter of political convention as opposed to a constitutional dictate. There is debate over the justiciability of these conventions, but that is for a future Bangladeshi Supreme Court bench to decide.
Finally, the proposal to repeal the Digital Security Act is necessary for democracy to survive between elections. How democracies fare between elections is the most important indicator of a substantive democracy. Elections are merely one aspect of procedural democracy. Bangladesh is already on the verge of becoming a full autocracy, or a competitive-authoritarian regime if what remains between elections is a shell democracy, stripped of its most significant attributes that form its lifeblood: dissent, debate and free expression. The Act has no place in a confident, thriving democracy.
The author is a Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, Canada