China and Russia blur lines on “division of labour” in exerting influence over Central Asia
Kanat Shaku in Almaty, Intelli News
China’s growing influence over Central Asian economics, politics and security at the expense of Russia—a topic that is revisited repeatedly given its essential strategic import—continues to grab the attention of the region’s geopolitical observers. One of the most recent iterations of this focus came in the form of a report by a Washington-based think tank, the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute.
The report’s author, Bradley Jardine, indicated to RFE/RL in a recent interview that the traditional “division of labour” between China and Russia—where Russia takes care of security matters and China focuses on economic influence—is fading. The report itself indicates this process is under way in its citation of Chinese military equipment sales to the region. They have come to account for 18% of military hardware in Central Asia in the past five years as opposed to the mere 1.5% in 2010-2014. Despite Russia’s continued military dominance in the region, the report sees the development as significant.
“In September 2018, Kazakhstan bought eight Chinese Y-8 transport airplanes, modelled on the Russian Antonov An-12. This activity has also led to a diminishing lead for Russia in the supply of advanced weapons systems,” the report reads.
China is also seen as dominating in areas where Russian technology continues to lag, including with reference to the CH-3, CH-4, CH-5 and the Wing Loong armed drones received by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in 2014-2016, the report posits. The Chinese drones also compete against products emerging from US and Israeli industries.
Protecting its investments: As Beijing’s investments in the region via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for trade infrastructure, trade and investment continue to grow, it has been seen as inevitable that China will eventually engage in protecting its investments.
Clear signs of the policy are visible in Beijing’s increased military cooperation with Tajikistan. The two countries held counter-terrorism exercises on the Tajik-Afghan border in 2016 and the giant eastern neighbour offered to build several military outposts and facilities. The existence of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) did not prevent China in 2016 from forming a new group with Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan to combat terrorism, dubbed the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordi¬nation Mechanism (QCCM).
Independent think tank International Crisis Group said in 2018 that China has deployed troops in Tajikistan close to a three-way Tajik-Chinese-Afghan border, establishing a “counter-terrorism centre”. The move by China was supposedly aimed at ensuring security against ethnic Uighur militants who have been leaving China to join extremist groups such as the Afghanistan-based Turkistan Islamic Party.
Joint military exercises: In August 2019, China held joint military exercises with Kyrgyzstan in China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region which borders Kyrgyzstan and with Tajikistan at the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, an autonomous zone within Tajikistan.
Many observers in Russia do not appear to see China’s expansion as a sign of major aspirations to expand military influence over Central Asia, since much of China’s military cooperation is directed at its concerns over potential Islamic terrorism in Xinjiang and its connection to ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan. The borders of Afghanistan, Tajikistan and China intersect, making China’s presence in Tajikistan seemingly a matter related to China’s Xinjiang concerns rather than a case of a regional military buildup. An expert from the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISS), Ivetta Frolova, appeared to uphold this view on China in a recent interview with the Central Asia Analytical Network.
“Today, the Chinese leadership faces a number of tasks that need to be addressed taking into account the peculiarities of internal socio-economic development and the promotion of projects within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative,” Frolova said. “These difficulties are exacerbated due to the situation caused by the spread of coronavirus, in which the whole world is currently enveloped. Therefore, China will have to resolve many more problems before developing strategic plans to build up its military-political presence in any region of the world, especially in such a complex one as Central Asia.”
Russia’s handling of Uzbekistan
This can be seen in Russia’s handling of Uzbekistan, which has been attempting to open itself up to foreign investment. Russia’s courting of Uzbekistan covers a range of sectors, including an agreement to handle the construction of a nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan. However, the greatest push by Russia remains its attempt to convince Uzbek authorities to join the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Uzbekistan has already agreed to take observer status within the EEU this year and it appears that many parties in the most populous Central Asian state remain convinced that a full membership would benefit the nation.